RAILROADS AND THE FULL-CREW PROBLEM
The efforts of the railroad industry to enjoin enforcement of state fullcrew laws, insofar as they applied to diesel locomotives operating in other
than passenger service, received a major set-back recently when the
Supreme Court of the United States upheld the validity of two Arkansas
full-crew statutes.' In a 7-2 decision in Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co.' the court reversed
an earlier District Court decision' and held that the Arkansas statutes
were not superseded by Public Law 88-1081 nor by an arbitration award
made under that statute.'
The rail carriers presented two basic arguments in support of their
contention that the Arkansas statutes requiring full-crews should be declared unconstitutional: first, that the statutes violated the Commerce,
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution,
and secondly, that the Arkansas laws were pre-empted by Public Law
88-108 which had been enacted for the purpose of settling a nationwide
railroad dispute. The Supreme Court dealt only with the railroad's second
argument (which in fact was their primary reason for initially bringing
this action) and remanded the case to the District Court for consideration of the constitutional issues left undecided by that tribunal.
In dealing with the second point all the members of the Court agreed
that under the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution6 Congress
has the power to regulate the number of men to be used on trains involved
in interstate commerce or which are operated by carriers engaged in interstate commerce.7 However, Justice Douglas in the minority opinion
argued that Congress did not intend to solve this problem of national magnitude with legislation that would be effective in only those states which
did not regulate crew size by law or administrative regulation. He therefore held that state full-crew laws must fall as a result of the superseding
1

ARK. ACT 116 OF 1907, ARK. STAT. ANN. #73-720 through 722 (1957). ARK. ACT 67 or
1913, ARK. STAT. ANN. #73-726 through 729 (1957).
2 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co.,

382 U.S. 423 (1966).
3 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Hardin and Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, 239 F.Supp.1 (D.C. Ark. 1965). This case was heard by a three judge Federal District Court and was appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C.
§1253 which took the case because of the constitutional issues involved.
4
Pub.L. No. 88-108, 77 Stat. 132 (1963). This law was enacted to prevent a threatened
nationwide railroad strike. It called for the establishment of an arbitration board to settle
crew disputes between carriers and unions. The arbitration award was to stay in effect for two
years, during which period the unions were not to strike.
5 Arbitration award made by National Railway Arbitration Board No. 282.
6 U.S. CONST. art I, §8.
7 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.,
382 U.S. 423, 429 and 438 (1966).
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Federal legislation, there being no intent in the legislation to preserve
them.
The majority of the court on the other hand held that Public Law
88-108 did not supersede state full-crew laws because that was not the
intention of Congress when it enacted this legislation. Congress was attempting to prevent a national railroad strike by solving a problem involving certain railroads and certain unions and had no intent to enact a
uniform law which would bind those areas which had full-crew laws and
which were not involved in the dispute.9
In support of its decision the majority of the court relied upon a previous Supreme Court decision which had upheld the validity of these two
Arkansas statutes. In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Norewood'0 it
stated that, "In the absence of a clearly express purpose so to do Congress
will not be held to have intended to prevent the exertion of the police
power of the States for the regulation of the number of men to be employed in such crews." " Three basic reasons were advanced by the court
for its decision in the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers case:
(1) Public Law 88-108 which the railroad contended had superseded
state full-crew laws contained no section pre-empting state laws. 2
(2) The Chairman of the House Committee on several occasions emphatically stated in the hearings and on the House floor that the
bill was not intended, either as proposed or as passed, to supersede state laws.'
(3) The dispute was not over the size of crews in states which had
such laws but rather it involved a collective bargaining issue in
states where the area had not been determined by statute. 4
I
WHY THE CARRIERS WISH TO ELIMINATE FULL-CREW REQUIREMENTS

The primary reason why the carriers want these crew requirements eliminated is purely one of economics. Most of the state full-crew laws now in
8 Id. at 447. Here Justice Douglas quoted in part from Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Hardin and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 239 F.Supp. 1, 23 (D.C. Ark.
1965).
9 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co.,
382 U.S. 423, 433 (1966).
10 Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Norewood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931).
11 Id. at 256. The Supreme Court in this case held that the Arkansas full-crew statutes did
not violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution.
12 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co.,
382 U.S. 423, 435 (1966).
13 Ibid.
14
Ibid.
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existence were passed for the first time in the early part of this century
before diesel locomotives came into use. These statutes enacted under the
police power of the states were for the protection of railroad employees
and the general public.15 A few early decisions held that these laws did not
apply to diesel or electric powered locomotives." The courts in these decisions pointed out that these statutes were enacted before diesel locomotives had come into use and therefore were not directed at them but were
directed at the steam driven locomotives. They showed that on steam
driven locomotives a fireman was needed on the left side of the train,
while on diesel locomotives the fireman served no useful purpose and
therefore the railroads should not be forced to use them on diesels.' The
result of these decisions was that firemen were not used on many of the
early diesels.
Then in 1936, in an effort to protect the jobs of its union members,
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen asked the carriers to use firemen
or helpers on all types of locomotives in road, yard, and other classes of
service. 8 The carriers agreed to this proposal because at the time it involved only about 700 firemen who worked on the 218 diesels then in
existence, and they entered into the National Diesel-Electric Agreement of
February 28, 1937. By 1961 this agreement was costing the carriers millions of dollars annually, for by that time there were over 28,150 diesels
in operation and upwards of 45,000 firemen's jobs depended on the successors of this agreement which had been incorporated into every collective bargaining agreement between the carriers and the union. 9
II
EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE FULL-CREW REQUIREMENTS

In 1959 the carriers launched upon a two pronged attack to do away with
full-crew requirements. One phase was aimed at the elimination of the
National Diesel-Electric Agreement and its successors through negotiation, while the other was aimed at state full-crew laws. The plan was to
eliminate all full-crew requirements so that eventually firemen would not
be required on diesels in other than passenger service.
Efforts to do away with the National Diesel-Electric Agreement
through collective bargaining agreements met with stiff resistance from the
15 Oregon, C. & E. Railway Co. v. Blackmer, 154 Or. 388, 59 P.2d 694 (1936).
16 Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Weinberg, 53 F.Supp. 133 (D.C. Minn. 1933); Western
Pacific Railroad Co. v. State of Nevada, 69 Nev. 66, 241 P.2d 846 (1952) ; Railroad Commission of Texas v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. (Texas Civ. App.) 42 S.W.2d 1091 (1931).
17 Western Pacific Railroad Co. v. State of Nevada, 69 Nev. 66, 241 P.2d 846 (1952).
18 Horowitz, "The Diesel-Fireman Issue-A Compromise of Treatment," 14 Labor Law
Journal 694 (1963).
19 Ibid.
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unions and this eventually led to the enactment of Public Law 80-108.
By July of 1963 the railroads and unions had not agreed on new crew
requirements and a strike appeared inevitable. In order to avoid a strike
President Kennedy requested a two-year period of study in which interim
work rules would be placed in effect."
Congress on August 19, 1963 enacted Public Law 88-108, the legislation requested by President Kennedy, but with one significant change.
Under the legislation enacted an arbitration board was to be established to
settle disputes on interim work rules that could not be resolved by the
parties. The legislation proposed by President Kennedy called for the
Interstate Commerce Commission to settle the dispute on interim work
rules. Congress did not follow his proposal because of the fear expressed
by at least one Brotherhood witness who testified before the Senate Commerce Committee that if the Interstate Commerce Commission was given
power over the dispute that it would declare state full-crew laws superseded by the commissions' actions. 1
Congress directed the arbitration board to pass on two issues: (1) the
use of firemen on other than steam-powered locomotives and (2) the size
and composition of train crews.22 In its report the board found that firemen
served no useful purpose, that they were not indispensable and that they
were no longer needed for fueling or as a lookout on the left side of the
train.
With regard to passenger trains where there are only two men in the
cab, the engineer and the firemen, the board found that firemen were
needed. In the operation of freight trains the board found that there
were three persons in the cab: engineer, fireman and head brakeman, while
only two were needed. The board held that on these trains firemen were
not needed and that only the head brakeman was needed to assist the engineer in the operation of the train. As to diesels engaged in yard service, the
board found that a second man was not necessary in the cab since employees standing on the ground or walking along with the train gave the
engineer all the guidance he needed. However, the board stated that in
some instances in yard service a fireman might be needed, so it directed
that 10% of these firemen be retained.
Existing employees who would be affected by its decision were provided for by the arbitration award. Employees hired within two years prior
to the effective date of the award would not be entitled to retain their em20

Text of President Kennedy's message, 109

CONG.

REc. 13004 (House of Representatives),

109 CONG. REc. 13095 (Senate); U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1537

(1963).
21 Hearings before Senate Committee on Commerce on S.J.Res. No. 102, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., 629.
22 Pub.L. No. 88-108, 77 Stat. 132 (1963).
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ployment or seniority rights, but if discharged would receive a lump-sum
payment which was to be determined according to a schedule prepared
by the board. Firemen with more than two years service prior to the effective date of the award would retain employment and seniority rights
with the qualification that those firemen who had more than two but less
than ten years service might be offered comparable positions.23
The second phase of the carriers attack on state full-crew laws has met
with quite a bit of success even though the Supreme Court in Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. 24
refused to declare the Arkansas full-crew laws superseded by Public Law
88-108. Had the Supreme Court declared these laws superseded all fullcrew laws would have eventually been declared invalid on the basis of
this decision.
In 1959 when the carriers made their first move to invalidate these fullcrew laws there were fourteen states that had such legislation. 5 At the
present time such statutes are in effect in only seven states. 6 One of the
seven, Texas, through court action in State of Texas v. Southern Pacific
Co.2" has suspended its full-crew law, but it appears that this is only a
temporary suspension and the laws may soon be made effective again. In
the Texas case the court relied upon Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Hardin" and held that its full-crew laws were suspended by
Public Law 99-108. At the present time, however, Public Law 88-108 has
expired 29 and the decision relied upon was reversed in Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co.,3"
so it appears likely that if the Texas court is called upon to reconsider its
earlier decision it will reverse it.
Indiana, another one of the states with full-crew laws, found itself in
23 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co.
and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., (48 L.C. 30, 454)
225 F. Supp. 11 (D.C.D.C. 1964), affirmed 331 F.2d 1020 (1964), cert. denied 337 U.S. 918
(1964). This decision also upheld the validity of the arbitration award made under Public
Law 88-108.
24 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co.,
382 U.S. 423 (1966).
25 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Indiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wisconsin.
26 Arkansas, Indiana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wisconsin.
27 State of Texas, The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen, and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Southern Pacific Co.,
(Texas Civ. App.) 392 S.W.2d 497 (1965).
28 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Hardin, 239 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. Ark. 1965).
29 The arbitration award made under Public Law 88-108 was to stay in effect a maximum
of two years. This period was to expire on January 25, 1966 but because of an agreement entered into between most of the carriers and unions it did not expire until March 31, 1966.
80
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co.,
382 U.S. 423 (1966).
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a situation similar to that of Texas not long ago. A Superior Court had enjoined enforcement of the Indiana full-crew statutes3 on the basis of Public Law 88-108. However, the Indiana Supreme Court in Public Service
Commission v. New York Central Railroad Co."2 reversed the lower
court's decision and dissolved the injunction. In its decision the Indiana
court relied on the recently decided Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
case.
Since 1959 seven states have eliminated these laws through various
methods. Three states-Mississippi, Oregon and Nebraska-have repealed their statutes through legislative action. Arizona, California83 and
North Dakota repealed their legislation by initiative measures which were
submitted to the voters. Nevada is the only state which has made its fullcrew laws inoperable through judicial action. In Southern Pacific Co. v.
Dicherson' the Nevada Supreme Court held that its full-crew laws did not
apply to diesel locomotives but were still operable in so far as steam
driven locomotives were concerned.
In each instance where state full-crew laws have been invalidated the
railroads have been largely responsible for the result. It was through the
efforts of their legislative representatives that Mississippi, Oregon and
Nebraska repealed their laws. In Arizona, California and North Dakota
they worked to get the initiative measures on the ballot and then to get
them enacted by the voters, and in Nevada it was the attorneys for a railroad that convinced the court that the Nevada full-crew laws should not
apply to diesel locomotives.
III
THE PRESENT SITUATION

Public Law 88-108 provided that the arbitration award was to continue in
force for such period as the board should determine, but not to exceed two
years from its effective date. 8 The expiration date was set originally for
January 25, 1966 but because of an agreement between the carriers and
the unions this date was extended to March 31, 1966.36
31 BuRNs ANN. INDIANA STAT. §§55-1326 through 1338 (1951).
32

Public Service Commission v. New York Central Railroad Co.. ...... Ind- .......

216 N.E.

2d 716 (1966).

33 The initiative measure which was adopted by the California voters on November 3, 1964
made effective in California the arbitration award made under Public Law 88-108. It left in
existence §6901 of the Labor Code which required a fireman on passenger trains, but it repealed §6902 and §6903 of the Labor Code which dealt with firemen on other than passenger
trains.

34 Southern Pacific Co. v. Dicherson, 80 Nev. 572, 397 P.2d 187 (1964).
35 Pub.L. No. 88-108, 77 Stat. 132 (1963).
36
Bangor and Aroostock Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, and Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. The Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Railroad Co. 253 F. Supp. 682 (D.C.D.C. 1966).
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Prior to this date the unions served notices upon the carriers that they
wanted the old crew requirements reinstated at the termination of the two
year period and also that they wanted those firemen who had lost their
jobs as a result of the decision of the arbitration board rehired. The carriers did not agree to these demands and within a short time actions were
brought to determine the status of the situation after termination. Were
the new rules to remain in effect? Was the pre-arbitration status quo to be
returned to? If not, when could the unions strike for changes in the work
rules?
Two recent cases have considered these problems."7 Both were decided
by Justice Holtzoff of the District Court for the District of Columbia, the
court where the arbitration award was filed according to the provisions of
the act. In these two decisions Justice Holtzoff held that the provisions of
the award and actions taken under it during its effective period created a
new set of rules and working conditions as to the date of termination and
that any attempt to change the new status may be pursued only by serving appropriate notice under section 6 of the Railroad Labor Act 8 and
by following the procedures set out by that statute." In effect this means
that no further steps may be taken by either side under the award after its
termination but what has been accomplished by it is not to be nullified or
wiped out.
In the Bangor case the court held that when full-crew laws end in a
state carriers may not sever employment in accordance with the award."°
This is of importance to the state of Oregon for it repealed its full-crew
laws effective January 1, 1967 so that it could take advantage of the arbitration award.4 1 Carriers in Oregon will still benefit from the award, that
is they will not be required to hire men to fill jobs which become vacant
through normal attrition and which were eliminated by the arbitration
award, but they will not be able to discharge men with less than two years
service as was provided under the award.
CONCLUSION

Full-crew requirements and the problems associated with them still exist.
Though the arbitration award made under Public Law 88-108 has expired
and the unions are attempting to get the old work rules reinstated through
87 Akron & Barberton Belt Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 250 F.
Supp. 691 (D.C.D.C. 1966); Bangor and Aroostock Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, and Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. The
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Co. 253 F. Supp. 682 (D.C.D.C. 1966).
8845 U.S.C. §156 (1964).

39 Bangor and Aroostock Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, and Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. The Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Railroad Co. 253 F. Supp. 682 (D.C.D.C. 1966).
40

Id. at 687.

41 Ibid.
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court action and collective bargaining it appears that they will fail. A
Federal District Court has held that actions taken under the award during
its effective period created a new set of rules and working conditions" and
if these cases are appealed it seems likely that the Supreme Court would
rather affirm than to hold that the parties are to revert to the pre-arbitration
status quo. To do that would accomplish nothing and would put the carriers and the unions back to where they were in 1963, at an impasse and
with the prospect of an imminent national strike.
As things stand a national railroad strike is not in the immediate
future because before the unions can strike the carriers they must comply
with the procedures set out in the Railway Labor Act. These procedures
which provide for temporary injunctions, mediation and a Presidential
Review Board take many months before they are exhausted and the unions
may strike.
If the unions do persist in their demands though and another national
railroad strike appears imminent one thing is certain: the President and
Congress will not permit it and legislation will be enacted to prevent it.
This time however, Congress might not come up with a temporary solution but would solve the problem through legislation which would affect
all states. What Congress would provide for is difficult to predict, but it
seems likely that if legislation is passed it will be similar to the arbitration
award made under Public Law 88-108, for these are the provisions that
are in effect in the vast majority of states.
It would seem that the Unions will not strike over new crew requirements unless there is no other way out of the situation. To do so might
jeopardize the full-crew laws remaining in the seven states which still
retain them. The unions will, however, continue to press the issue and
threaten to strike. Union officials will do this for primarily two reasons:
first to show the rank and file members that those on the top are working
to protect their jobs, and secondly to get concessions from the railroads in
new contract negotiations.
William Ward
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